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I.

....

INTRODUCTION

They are an insecure people from an insular nation no
bigger than California, hiding their national vulnerabilities
behind a veil of yen, escaping their crowded cities to roam
a world in which they increasingly are resented and even
reviled - ambassadors of a nation notably devoid of the
idealism or ideology that has motivated great powers in the
past.
They are the richest of people and the poorest of people;
the most envied of leaders and the most eager of followers;
the strongest of global competitors and the most fragile of
global powers. In the increasingly intense struggle for world
leadership, Japan is winning many of the battles. But can
it win the war?,
This statement effectively highlights the paranoia that the rest of
the world is feeling in light of Japan's economic revitalization that has
*Professor of Business Law, College of Commerce and Business Administration, University
of Illinois. B.A., City University of New York, 1968; J.D., University of Illinois, 1971; Diploma
in International Law, Stockholm University, 1973.
**Joint Degree Candidate, J.D./ M.B.A., University of Iowa; B.B.S., University of Iowa,
1988.
1. House, The '90s & Beyond; Though Rich, Japan is Poor in Many Elements of Global
Leadership, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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enabled it to prosper in ways that seem to defy its identity as a small,
poor nation. In consideration of the fact that Japan was once an overpopulated nation that made only tiny transistor radios, the vitality
with which economic prosperity propelled the country has stunned
many nations. Furthermore, many nations are now pondering the
tactics used by the Japanese to create the events which culminated
in the birth of the economic miracle. Correspondingly, these curious
nations are finding that Japan has achieved its success by developing
a strategy designed to utilize its cultural predilection for cohesiveness
through the hard work of the members of its close-knit population;
hence, in its complete uniqueness, Japan has been able to transform
itself into what appears to be one of the wealthiest and most technically
2
advanced nations in the world.
Despite the fact that Japan has grown incredibly fast economically,
it has, nevertheless, failed to learn how to exercise a world position
commensurate with its relative wealth and strength. The irony of this
situation - economic strength accompanied by political indecision is the consequence of Japan's tendencies to create images of itself
propagated by a sense of "poorness" which render it incapable of, or
more appropriately unwilling to, commit itself to any decisive position,
let alone a strong position, in the global arena. This paradox is
explained somewhat better in terms of the prevalent belief emanating
from the periphery that depicts Japan as a tiny, resource-poor nation. 3
Therefore, given this poor country mentality, Japan unsurprisingly
tends to borrow from the West, identify with the West, and conduct
4
business with the West.
Many theorize that it is precisely this poor country mentality that
will prevent Japan from realizing its true potential in the global arena.
The proliferation of this poor country mentality is fueled by, and
indeed perpetuated by, the attitude of the Japanese people toward
the problems facing their nation. Upon consideration of such problems,
the Japanese tend to become even more withdrawn and insecure,
uncertain, and pessimistic of their ability to be a world power. 5 Consequently, many nations have begun to surmise that Japan is, despite
its efforts at internationalization of its closed society, indeed a backward country as opposed to an advanced country. This belief was

2. Id.
3. Johnson, JapaneseStyle Management in America, 30 CAL. MGMT. REV. 34,34-35 (1988).
4. Wysocki, Closed Society: Despite Global Rule, Many Japanese Try to Avoid Foreigners,
Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
5. Kanabayashi, The Japanese, Despite Great Affluence, Perceive Themselves as Poor,
Insecure, Wall St. J., June 4, 1987, at A26, col. 1.
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surmised succinctly by Yano Toru, Professor of Political Science at

the Center for Southeast Asian Studies:
In a sense, it is false to characterize Japan as an advanced
nation. It is simply not right to call a country that retains
so many old-fashioned practices in politics and government
"advanced." Japanese politics has, in a very Japanese way,
elaborately institutionalized backwardness in a process that
I call the involution of backwardness; politics has regressed
to an almost irretrievably primitive stage and become an
obstacle to advancement in other sectors of national life.6

Toru continues in his analysis of the "involution of backwardness" by
explaining that the prospect of overcoming the irrationality of this
belief is not foreseeable in the near future to the extent that the
process of backwardness juxtaposed with the poor country mentality
has been ingrained firmly in the Japanese culture. 7 Thus, the internationalization of Japan and its ability to prosper as a world power
will depend on the extent to which Japan is able to shed some of its
customary practices and forgo its affinity with being a closed society
which avoids contact with outsiders in an attitude of fear.8
Thus far, the debate over whether Japan will become a global
power seems to favor those who argue that Japan has too many deficiencies that will prevent it from becoming a broader global power. 9
Specifically, this conclusion seems to be supported by Japanese tendencies to view its situation with myopic perspective thereby permitting
it to function as it pleases within its country and to interact with the
rest of the world to a limited degree under the guise of a poor nation.
It is this poor country mentality in conjunction with a fear of what is
outside of Japan that forms the fundamental attitude of Japanese society.
II.

JAPAN IN AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The problem of interactions between Japan and any other country
is premised along the contours of a basic lack of understanding due
to an information deficit as well as to a misunderstanding of the cultures and practices. Furthermore, the difficulty of understanding the
cultures is intertwined with the development of each country. Essen-

6.
7.
8.
9.

Toru, A New Outlook for Internationalization,34 JAPAN Q. 8, 8 (1987).
Id.
Wysocki, supra note 4, at Al.
House, supra note 1, at Al.
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tially, the United States developed through the promulgation of clear,
fair, and accessible rules and practices. The purpose of these rules
and practices was to ensure the vitality of the nation and of individual
rights. The essence of these rules and procedures was that they were
made for everyone, by people from all over the world with different
backgrounds and experiences. 10 Conversely, Japan developed in a much
different manner. Japanese society began as a homogeneous society
based on the trust and bonds of allegiance of the group as a whole.
In this society, perfect group order was achieved and maintained
through formal written rules and practices.1
The difficulties which the United States and Japan experience while
attempting to interact with one another are easily explainable by the
inability of both actors to understand the cultures of the other which
thereby prevents them from coming to terms with each other. For
example, Japan portrays itself as a democracy and a market economy
similar to that of the United States. Given this projection, the United
States, in turn, assumes that Japan is like the United States and that
it, therefore, will have the same considerations and ideals. Add to
these differences in societies and cultures the fact that Japan limits
its attempts at internationalization through the invocation of its poor
country mentality plus the countervailing attitude of being socially
isolated and segregated, and it is not too difficult to see how frictions
develop among not only the United States and Japan, but among other
countries and Japan as well.H
This difficulty is paradoxically complicated by Japan's attempts at
internationalization without the precursory change of its closed society
that is necessary for success. This aspect of Japan is best explained
by Japan's perception of itself as being a poor country that needs all
the help it can get. Thus, Japan seems to have nothing against interacting with foreign nations as long as such nations stay out of Japan and
do not disrupt its culture. This proclivity toward a closed society is
the result of a long process of historical development through which
Japan has attempted to use its people as a means for making up for
its perceived inadequacies.
When examining the culture of Japan, the most pervasive attitude
is that of ethnic bonding which dictates that all Japanese people are
related by blood ties. The historical development of this belief can be

10.

Prestowitz, U.S.-Japan Trade Friction: Creating a New Relationship, 29 CAL. MGMT.

REV. 9, 17 (1987).
11.

M.

BLACKFORD, THE RISE OF MODERN BUSINESS IN GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED

35 (1988).
Wysocki, supra note 4, at Al.

STATES, AND JAPAN 9-10,

12.
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traced to the formation of the first influential governmental systems
in Japan. The Tokugawa Period, 1603-1868, was perhaps the first
source of this unity. This period was characterized by a governmental
structure known as a bakufu or baku-han which was a non-institutionalized form of personal government based on trust and bonds
of allegiance. Also characteristic of this period was the Confucian ideal
of social harmony which touted that the physical world was premised
along the lines of perfect order inherent in the social functionings of
a society; this order was disturbed only when people neglected to
notice the prevailing state of order.13 The natural outgrowth of this
ideal was the development of a legal and psychological stance based
on the concept of the group as opposed to the individual. In this
society, the individual as such was irrelevant in the hierarchy of the
group. Resultantly, the law and all attitudes in society were developed
along the lines of the social group or social family. These laws, based
on group harmony and the interrelationship of the government and
business, have continued throughout the development of the country
and pose some of the difficulties Japan is having in becoming a world
power.
One of the implications of this inclination toward group cohesion
and bonding was the isolation of Japanese society and also a misunderstanding of the culture. Years of group cohesion have created a
very tribal people united by a seemingly monolithic language, culture,
race, and religion which characterizes an inward-looking and consciously void people. Hence, during the Tokugawa Period, society was
depicted by myths and rituals which symbolized the tribal society.
The discrepancy of the Tokugawa Period resulted in a transformation of society induced by the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in which a
new governmental system was formed based on institutional rather
than personal goals. Consequently, the Japanese image was changed
somewhat in that industries were created to serve the state and the
14
public image was improved in conformance with Confucian ideals.
The shogun who ruled during the Tokugawa Period was deposed and
the emperor was returned to power. In this position, the government
was able to unite people in their "complete Japaneseness" by entreating the "infinite embrace" of the father-emperor.15
Also during this time period, Japan became an actor in the balanceof-power game being played by the Western powers, and thus, the

13. M. BLACKFORD, supra note 11, at 22-26.
14. Id.
15. Toru, supra note 6, at 9.
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degree of modern nationalism was attached to Japan's identity. However, despite the fact that Japan's government had evolved into a
somewhat institutionalized unit and despite the fact that Japan was
beginning to become involved in global activities, it nevertheless did
not lose any of its inclinations toward closedness, thus the paradox of
internationalization. The tendencies of the Tokugawa Period carried
over into the Meiji Period. These forces were strengthened further
as members of the tribal society continued to look inward, socially
stagnant in the happenings of their own society and relatively impervious to the happenings outside the tiny space of land called Japan.
Thus, the scene was set for Japan's functionings in a modern world:
Japan insists on seeking its identity in the old-fashioned manner of
establishing and maintaining the unity of its people and its common
culture. Throughout the years, the existence of this myopic vision has
resulted in the continuation and propagation of a national identity
based on cohesion, harmony, and a closed society. Therefore, the previous reference by Yano Toru to Japan's backwardness is given credence by the fact that the internationalization of Japan has been sufficiently hindered by the aspects of the culture which promote a selfcentered attitude, thereby blinding Japan from seeing the reality that
6
other cultures exist in the world.1
III.

THE MYOPIC VIEW OF JAPAN:

Tatamae AND Honne

The previous historical analysis was an attempt to illuminate some
of the factors that have shaped Japanese society. Essentially, the
problem revolves around an implicit misunderstanding and misconception of the Japanese. Unfortunately, these misconceptions extend far
beyond the confines of the previously described problems to a level
which governs the whole relationship among the Japanese and the
United States. As one would expect, this discrepancy is based upon
a lack of information. However, the discrepancy extends far beyond
the scope of this discussion up until now; for the discrepancy is not
limited to the traditional, cultural, and legal conscripts which differentiate Japan from other countries. Instead, the discrepancy is a combination of these factors in addition to the belief held by foreign countries
that they can wield a significant amount of pressure on Japan to
change. However, history has proven that this belief, although substantiated by words, is unsubstantiated in action. Nevertheless, external sources continue to think that they can exert enough pressure so

16. Ohmae, Japan's Role in the World Economy: A New Appraisal, 29 CAL. MGMT. REV.
42, 50 (1987).
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that at some point, Japan will be forced to change. Unfortunately,
these external sources neglect to consider the extreme importance the
Japanese place on custom and tradition.
The belief held by foreign countries, and in particular the U.S.,
that they can change the actions taken by Japan can be traced, once
again, to the historical development of the nation. The emergence of
the shogun in the Tokugawa Period signified the commencement of a
400 year span of peace and feudal custom in which Japan was completely isolated from the rest of the world. This isolation ended in
1868 with the arrival of Commodore Perry at which time feudal tradition was discarded while Confucian ideals continued to influence behavior and the culture of the society. After World War II, the U.S.,
as part of its endeavor to make Japan a bastion of democracy and
wealth, modified Japan's legal philosophy to resemble American concepts of democracy and economic policies.
Certainly, the U.S. had a significant impact on the development
of law in Japan as was evidenced by the way in which Japan borrowed
from the U.S. and other foreign models. Unfortunately, in their outlook regarding the extent of its influence upon Japan, foreign sources
have neglected to view the amount of tailoring that the Japanese do
in the application of the law. Each time Japan borrowed from a model,
they adapted it to their own society in accordance with custom and
tradition. Additionally, a number of laws were borrowed wholesale
without any modifications to Japanese society, thereby resulting in a
disparity in the written law and the application of that law. 17 Therefore,
what superficially appeared as a direct application of something borrowed from an external model in a reshaping of the society was, in
actuality, a surface change without a concomitant change in attitudes
and beliefs necessary to change the application of these laws. Tetsundo
Iwakuni, a brokerage house executive, addressed the reality of this
problem when he explained that "[t]he misconception is that changes
in the laws will lead to a change in traditional Japanese relations and
Japanese society." In respect to the Finance Ministry's restructuring
of laws to allow foreign countries to participate in the Tokyo capital
market, Iwakuni stressed that "no new laws or modification of regulatory barriers will change Japanese society overnight. In other words,
18
a change on paper does not mean a change in the marketplace.'

17. Comment, Japan'sNew Equal Employment Opportunity Law: Real Weapon or Heirloom Sword?, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 866.
18. Iwakuni, Laws May Change But Japanese Society Does Not, 6 INT'L TAx & Bus.
LAW.

300 (1988).
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Nevertheless, foreign countries, and particularly the U.S., fail to
see this reality. By overestimating the influence that they have on
Japan, they inadvertently fail to see the unique aspects of Japanese
society which pose barriers to fulfillment of changes. In addition, they
fail to see that Japan is actually appeasing them to avoid confrontation.
Thus, what appears to be changes in the law is actually a method
used by the Japanese to appear progressive in their relations with
other countries. The validity of this statement can be found in writings
as early as 1967: "Scholars sometimes compare law in Japan to an
heirloom sword that is no more than an ornament or a prestige symbol
used to make Japan appear respectable in Western eyes; it is taken
out and shown to outsiders but is rarely, if ever, used." 9 Necessarily,
the key to understanding the Japanese and their laws seems to be an
understanding of Japan's true intentions and what Japan would like
others to think its intentions are. This dilemma can be explained in
Japanese terms as a discrepancy between tatamae or "the desired
appearance of things" and honne or the "actual condition, the real
thoughts, the motives that one has." 2° Essentially, to better deal with
the Japanese, other countries need to realize that change must be
sought from within Japan as opposed to being imposed by outside
sources.
Nowhere does the discrepancy between the written law and the
law in practice, or the tatamae and honne, become more apparent
than in recent changes in the law as it pertains to women. To better
understand these changes, an enlightment from Iwakuni serves well:
Japan, as you know, is a country bound by tradition. It is
also a country that has very deep respect for the law. In
Japan, when a law passes Parliament, it is supreme, and
will not be violated. For that reason, many non-Japanese
expect that the enactment of a law will change Japanese
society overnight. As I stated earlier, that is a misconception. It fails to recognize the very pervasive continuing influence Japanese tradition has on Japanese society. While the
Japanese will scrupulously follow the letter of the law, the
customary Japanese way of doing business inexorably works
to defeat the stated purpose of that law .... 21

19. Comment, supra note 17, at 865 (citing T.
(JAPANESE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS)

20. Id. at 866 (quoting F.
21.

KAWASHIMA,

NIHONJIN No HOISHIKI

47 (1967)).

GIBNEY, MIRACLE BY DESIGN

12 (1982)).

Iwakuni, supra note 18, at 304.
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This statement is a perfect example of how the tatamae guides
Japanese actions in regard to the written law. This statement is especially pertinent to the application of the Constitution in reference to
women and in the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
(EEOA). The EEOA necessitates equality in the whole selection process as well as in promotion, working hours and conditions, and fringe
benefits. As is true of most of the laws promulgated in Japan since
World War II, this law was adopted to satisfy the criticisms from
external sources. In light of the discrimination against women in
Japanese society as well as in the world, the United Nation's passage
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, which required that all appropriate
measures be taken to end discrimination against women, provided the
impetus for criticism against Japan and pressure from outside sources
to adopt a law in accord with the Convention.- Unfortunately, there
was very little, if any, internal support for the adoption of a law and
correspondingly, Japan again adopted a law to "save face" in the
international community.
Thus, Japan now has a law on the books which purports to protect
women against discrimination in employment, but which, given the
tatamae of society, does nothing to protect women. The fact that
women's rights would remain static in Japan should have been obvious
to the extent that the Japanese Constitution specifically forbids any
sort of discrimination against women. Together, these two sources of
law, the Constitution and the EEOA, will serve as tatamae to provide
a facade for the outside world. That this statement is true has already
been proven by the defense mechanisms that have been established
to sidestep the safeguards of the laws. The most blatant example of
such a defense mechanism can be seen through the belief that the
Constitution can be interpreted to permit "reasonable" discrimination
against women. Moreover, to placate the wa, or harmony, the law
provides no enforcement mechanism by which to punish offenders.
Given the cultural predisposition to not resort to litigation, there is
basically no means by which a woman can seek recourse through the
law.
Essentially, Japanese behavior, given the mores and customs that
have been inculcated into each member of Japanese society, will not
conform to the prescripts of a law unless that law is in accordance
with the specific realities of society. This statement is supported by
the preservation of the discrepancy between tatamae and honne

22.

Comment, supra note 17, at 871-872.
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whereby "a man chooses to obey or disobey a law on the basis of the
extent to which it accords with the facts of human existence [the
honne]."23 Such a change in the facts of human existence can be accomplished over time only by the accumulation of internal pressure.
Unfortunately, in consideration of the cultural values of the society,
it seems somewhat premature to expect that such a change in the
nature of human existence will occur in the near future.
IV.

JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The preceding discussion on the culture and attitude of Japanese
society provides a framework for analyzing the functioning of Japan
in the global arena. Moreover, the preceding discussion will help clarify
the issues pertaining to Japan's position in the international community. The main criticism of Japan has been that it does not know what
its position is in the world. Moreover, Japan has been accused of being
a one-dimensional power that worries only about itself.- One of the
most important contributors to this belief is Japan's position in Asia.
Given its location, it would not be unjustified to consider Japan an
Asian nation. However, after World War II and Japan's alignment
with the West, popular thought at the time treated Japan as though
it was part of the Western World. Although Japan still aligns itself
with the West, and indeed is militarily dependent on the U.S., the
tendency to regard Japan as part of the Western world is losing
popularity.
At the same time, Asian nations are beginning to clamor that they
will never accept Japan as an Asian nation. According to a Japanese
theory, Japan will, in the next century, incite an Asian bloc: "two
billion hard-working, self-sacrificing people, a full two-thirds of the
world's population all harnessed to Japan's economic ambitions." 5
However, the validity of this theory and the actualization of it stray
further from reality as time progresses and as Japan's strength increases; for, in a linear fashion, as Japan's strength increases, Asian
acrimony, skepticism, and trepidation also increase so that the likelihood of an Asian bloc decreases correspondingly. In the words of one
Korean economist, Park Ungsuh, "It's simply not possible for Asian
nations to be a viable bloc, because there is too much disparity between
economies. You have one giant, Japan, and many peanuts." The

23.
1972)).
24.
25.

Id. at 867 (quoting I.

BEN-DASAN, THE JAPANESE AND THE JEWS

99 (R. Gage transl.

House, supra note 1, at Al.
Id. at AS, col. 2.
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animosity of Asian nations will not be subdued by any Japanese efforts
directed toward aiding Asian nations.Along the same lines, Japan has problems identifying any viable
position in the UN. Initially, Japan's primary reason for joining the
UN was to supplement its national security as a safety net behind the
security promised by the treaty with the U.S. In accordance with this
desire to promote national security, Japan has taken great efforts to
ensure that it is elected to one of the ten elected seats in the Security
Council. Moreover, Japan has in recent years attempted to become a
permanent member of the Security Council. This venture possibly
may be supported by the U.S. but not by other UN members given
the reluctance of the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom
to constrain their privileged positions as well as the desire of other
countries to become a permanent member. 27
Nevertheless, Japan is one of the leading economic contributors to
UN funds. Therefore, given the level of economic aid, one would
expect Japan to exert a more powerful position commensurate with
the amount of aid given. However, economic and political roles are
two different situations for the Japanese. They are perfectly willing
to give huge amounts of money to the UN to become a permanent
member of the Security Council, but lack the confidence and the willpower to develop a substantial political role. The underpinnings of
this fear of defining a political role are outgrowths of harmony and
the avoidance of confrontation at all costs, as well as of the discrepancy
between tatamae and honne: It is harmony that makes the Japanese
servile and overaccommodating when bombarded with criticism; it is
the avoidance of confrontation that makes them adopt laws, policies,
or regulations to appease their critics; and it is the discrepancy between tatamae and honne which allow Japan to create a facade for
the rest of the world by eliciting certain intentions for the purpose of
satisfying criticism without actually changing the actual state of affairs.
Therefore, on controversial issues, Japan eventually affirms its solidarity with the West, but when it comes to the daily conduct of UN
business, Japan resists making any clear policy statements in an effort
to balance divergent demands for support against its national interest.
Given this balancing act, it is not surprising that the rest of the world,
especially Asian nations, view Japan as being a nation concerned only
for its national welfare.
Hence, it is not clear that Japan will be able to establish a position
when public attitude is so weighted against it. The ability of Japan

26.
27.

Id. at As, col. 3.
Ogata, Japan'sUnited Nations Policy in the 1980's, 27 ASIAN SURV. 957, 962 (1987).
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to do so is possibly at its prime. Japan is playing a prominent role
in giving economic support to the UN while Asian resentment has
not proliferated to the level of providing a barrier to the realization
of a more important role. Nonetheless, Japan has not modified its
political role in any way that could lead one to assert that it is deserving
of a more important position. As a matter of fact, this fledgling attitude
of asserting itself only when necessary and of symbolically appeasing
criticism has resulted in a loss of confidence from many of Japan's
supporters. At a time when Japan needs to win friends, not only is
it hampering any chances of doing so, but in an effort to remain
somewhat aloof in the international political environment, Japan is
also risking losing the friends that it now has.V.

THE JAPAN -

SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

The hesitancy of Japan to formulate a definite policy statement in
the political arena clearly can be seen in Japan's dealings with South
Africa. In this area, the culture of harmony, the desire to avoid confrontation, and the discrepancy between tatamae and honne and how
Japan allows these traditions to guide its actions becomes more clear.
In an effort to quell mounting international criticism, Japan aligned
itself with the West when it opposed the policy of apartheid abiding by
the General Assembly resolution requiring a suspension of diplomatic,
cultural, and sports relations with South Africa.29 Additionally, of its
own accord, Japan adopted policies designed to curtail relations with
South Africa such as banning direct air links, direct investment, and
tourist visas. Yet, despite this proclamation, Japan did not stop trading
with South Africa, an event which has made Japan South Africa's
leading trading partner, thereby invalidating its claims of attempting
to curtail relations. Correspondingly, Japan rationalizes its new position as a necessary result of the value that South Africa has in terms
of "strategically indispensable" materials such as chrome, platinum,
coal, and other minerals it provides to Japan. Additionally, Japan
circumvents its policy of not directly investing in South Africa by
investing through subsidiaries located in other countries. ° Resultingly,
Japan's trade with South Africa escalated at a drastic rate in the
beginning of 1988 as is evidenced by the fact that exports increased

28.

Stier, Keeping a Low Profile: Japan's Political Role in the U.N. Lags Behind its

Economic Part, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 17, 1988, at 34.
29. Ogata, supra note 27, at 965.
30. Smith, The Apartheid Dodge: Two Ministries' Squabbles Keep South African Trade
Going, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 17, 1988, at 36.
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by 51% in January and by 110% in February as compared to the same
period in 1987.
This newly found position as South Africa's foremost trading partner has evoked not only much criticism from the world, but also
specifically from the U.S. as it begins to contemplate how Japan attained this position. Specifically, the U.S. realizes that Japan's trade,
which is now two times larger than U.S. trade levels with South
Africa, may be the result of decreased American trade with South
Africa as well as an act by Japan to take advantage of the fact that
many U.S. firms are estranging themselves from South Africa. Accordingly, in appearance, as well as in all actuality, Japan seems to be in
the position of filling a vacuum created by the withdrawal of many
U.S. and European businesses.
Thus it appears that once again Japan has attempted to balance
its own security interest while appeasing worldwide criticism by adopting a policy to protest apartheid yet simultaneously using worldwide
criticism of apartheid to its trade advantage. Obviously, Japan is involved in a game of balancing conflicting areas of political obligations
and economic interests. Therefore, given this stance, it is not surprising that Japan is beginning to hear criticism even more loudly than
before, and this time, it is hearing it extremely loudly from the U.S.
Thus, Japan is not only risking losing the chance of attaining a position
as a world leader but it is also risking losing the support and confidence
of a number of nations, most notably the support of developing states.
The implications of losing the support of these countries are extremely
serious as these are the countries on which Japan must depend to
assume an elected seat in the Security Council.
Since Japan attained the position as South Africa's leading trading
partner, many businesses, usually at the prompting of the government,
have attempted to define the extent to which they should conduct
business with South Africa. However, many of the government's initial
attempts were designed to protect business interests, thereby substantiating the historically established tendency of Japan to shy away from
decisions which will threaten the interests of private business. The
ramifications of such a self-serving policy became evident when the
U.S., in 1986, adopted a law designed to penalize countries for taking
advantage of its efforts to curtail trade with South Africa to boost
their own trade. Finally, on March 28, 1988, the Ministry for International Trade and Industrialization (MITI) issued 'a statement asking
Japan's six leading trading companies to restrict their trade with South
Africa.3 1 Accordingly, NEC and Pioneer Electronics consented to inter31. Japan and South Africa: No, But We Saw the Film, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 1988, at 32,
col. 1.
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rupt exports to South Africa by the end of 1988; similarly, Nissan
agreed to decrease sales and the Mitsubishi group suspended bidding
to build an industrial plant in South Africa; Matsushita Electrical Industrial company proclaimed that it would close its office in Johannesburg, and Sanyo Electric Company is considering the possibility of
closing one of its offices and decreasing its trade with South Africa
by as much as fifteen percent annually. As a result of government
pressure and the actions of some Japanese businesses to restrain trade,
in 1988 there was a three and one-half percent decrease in trade.32
Nevertheless, Japan's posture as South Africa's leading trading partner was not changed. Resultingly, in December 1988, the UN General
Assembly passed a resolution which criticized Japanese dealings in
South Africa.VI.

THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT DIRECTION

The fact that Japan's position vis-A-vis South Africa has not changed
is due to the fact that the government has failed to make a direct,
clear policy recommendation for businesses to follow. Unfortunately,
given the history of the closeness between business and government
in Japan, businesses will not suspend relations with South Africa of
their own accord. As of this writing, the government has not issued
such a statement despite foreign criticism. Much of the reason for the
lack of a clear policy statement transcends the simplicity of an indifference to the situation; the Japanese government itself has been embroiled in a power struggle whereby one faction is attempting to
protect its authority as a governmental body. This struggle involves
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and MITI. Intrinsically, the
conflict between these two divisions of the government, which is not
unique to the South African situation, results from the division of
power and the levels of authority attributable to and characteristic of
the two units.
More clearly, the MFA is worried about appeasing foreign observers by promoting economic sanctions against South Africa and resultantly, it has been pushing for the reduction of trade by encouraging
private businesses to curtail business dealings with Pretoria. Conversely, MITI finds this policy regarding South Africa as diametrically
opposed to and, moreover, a usurpation of, its authority to monitor
a policy statement of free trade which is obviously contrary to the

32. Japan-PretoriaTrade Falls, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1989, at A18, col. 6.
33. Two Japanese Companies Plan Anti-Apartheid Moves, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1988, at
A18, col. 3.
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idea of sanctions. Furthermore, MITI feels that a policy statement to
decrease trade should come from MITI itself and not from the MFA.
Whether the dissent among these two governmental entities is a legitimate power/authority struggle or instead a prescript for failing to
develop a clear policy on South Africa has not been determined. However, popular opinion, based on historical behavior of the Japanese
government supports the contention that this on-going power struggle
is a means by which to divert a clear, precise statement to further
its economic interest in light of conflicting political obligations. 34
Support for this supposition can be seen in a number of areas and
actions taken by the government. Most importantly in this context is
the view held by foreigners that the Japanese place business above
all other concerns.- This is predictable given Japan's goal of being an
economic power and its lack of political and military influence in the
world. Additionally, many officials, specifically a Foreign Ministry
official, documented support for the assertion that many different
groups, from MITI to business leaders to the Liberal Democratic
Party, are less than eager to take actions which will threaten trade.
In this respect, Yoshiaki Umemura, Director of Trade Ministry's Middle East and Africa office, explained the dilemma as follows: "What
is important to consider is what is the most effective way to send a
message to the South African Government that it should change the
apartheid system. The fact that Japan has become No. 1 in the amount
of trade would not, by itself, merit a policy change."6
Thus, it has become incumbent upon private businesses to take
action on their own. Actually, the MFA is encouraging such self-restraint by businesses. As such, many private companies are attempting
to make decisions on their own as to what policy action to take regarding South Africa. Unfortunately, the government's inability to provide
a clear policy statement has confused businesses and stalled their
efforts to decrease trade relations with South Africa. Part of the
difficulty is due to the tradition of abiding by contracts and saving
face. Integral to understanding this difficulty is realizing that the
Japanese base their business relationships on friendship whereby
"friendship first, business second" is the guiding provence of Japanese
style. 7 Along the constructs of the Japanese style is the desire, and
34. Smith, supra note 30, at 37.
35. Chira, South Africa Trade Causes Rift in Japan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at D22,
col. 2.
36. Id. at D22, col. 1.
37. Rosch & Segler, Communication With the Japanese, 27 MGMT. INT'L REV. 56, 58
(1987) (quoting Sheng, Outsider's Perception of the Chinese, 14 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 16,
21 (1979)(noting that "[t]his expression is valid for Japan as well")).
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indeed the effort, to establish friendly relations via the elucidation of
trust among the bargaining members. Indeed, the negotiating praxis
revolves around the creation of goodwill and friendship. The importance of ordaining a spirit of friendship and good-will becomes clear
when one considers that the actualization and enforcement of the contract is not based on legal enforcement mechanisms. As long as goodwill exists, there is no need for the contract to be legally binding.
Through goodwill and trust any problems that may arise in regard to
the contract can be settled via mutual understanding and compromise.
The rationale for this odd negotiating style is based upon the preservation of harmony to avoid bad sentiments.3 Thus, to terminate a
long-term contract, which is based on trust and goodwill, a company
would need to cite force majeure; without this ruling, companies will
only freeze trade at the low levels established by the existing contract.
They will not, however, reduce imports or exports from South Africa.
Therefore, the opaque governmental policy has allowed businesses to
vacillate in their tendencies to alter trade levels. As expected, business
pleas to the government for a more precise statement are met with
pleasure from the MFA, a direct contrast to the negative connotations
expressed by MITI. Hence, it seems, for the time being, that the
MFA's outward desire for controls will be inhibited somewhat by
MITI.
The hesitancy to issue a statement is not only indicative of Japan's
posture in reference to harmony and its lack of will, but also it is
representative of the fact that change will occur neither in Japan nor
in its dealings unless pressure exudes from within in the form of public
criticism. Whereas in the beginning of the South African dilemma this
may have seemed like an impossibility, the potential now exists for
such public pressure to develop. Despite the fact that the public attempts to avoid politics in business, especially in regard to business
conducted abroad, the Japanese people are just now beginning to
consider their position as South Africa's leading trading partner. 9 The
showing of the movie Cry Freedom has increased public awareness
as to the problem of apartheid. Additionally, a Tokyo organization
known as the Japan Anti-Apartheid Committee has begun to sensitize
the people to the necessity of sanctions by organizing a boycott of
imported South African products.4 0 However, there was, at this writ-

38. Id. at 65.
39. Fujita, Pride and PrejudiceAmong the 'HonoraryWhites', FAR E. ECON. REV., June
16, 1988, at 44-45.
40. Schoenberger, Japan Irked at New Role as South Africa's Top Trade Partner;Government Asks Exporters to Exercise Self Restraint, L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1988, at D1, col. 1.
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ing, insufficient evidence to determine the degree of this arousal and
the effect of the arousal. One can be sure that the harmony will serve
as a serious impediment to the determination of public awareness on
this issue.
Moreover, Japan is a country tainted by racist attitudes and prejudicial practices. Due to the homogeneous nature of its closed society,
Japan refuses to admit anyone to its society who will upset the
homogeneous makeup of the country. Indeed, the Japanese, including
former Prime Minister Nakasone, often comment of the inferiority of
the American people because of the heterogeneity of American society.
Moreover, Japan discriminates against people within its own society,
for contrary to what it believes, it is not completely homogeneous as
can be seen by the 700,000 Koreans who have been there since 1910,
the aboriginal people, known as Ainu, who are segregated in Hokkaido,
a small population of Indochinese refugees, and an underclass group
of people called the burakumin.
These characteristics of Japanese society set the framework for
analyzing Japanese actions toward South Africa and for understanding
their refusal to recognize the injustices committed under the system
of apartheid. Nevertheless, Japan must realize that it is not an individual actor in the international spectrum and that there are ethical
and moral implications to its actions. However, there is much to be
desired in terms of making Japan realize the ethical and moral implications of its actions. There are two possible explanations for this
difficulty. One explanation, of course, is founded in the law of society.
Inherent in the Confucian ideas of Japanese society is the belief that
ethics and the law are synonymous so that "[i]f action is ethical and
moral, it is legal; the law is ipso facto ethical and moral. ' ' 41 In this

respect, the law was sort of subjective morality. In consideration of
what this discussion has purported to illuminate in terms of Japanese
application of the law and tatamae and honne, it is not difficult to
imagine how the Japanese lose sight of ethical and moral implications
of their actions. To the extent that they modify the law to their own
needs, they also very subjectively modify morality to their needs.
Another explanation of the lack of ethical and moral considerations
has to do with the unity of Japanese society that stresses everything
in terms of the group. Certainly, the Japanese do not see any moral
dilemma in the South African situation given their cultural predilection

41. Lansing & Wechsellblatt, Doing Business in Japan: The Importance of the Unwritten
Law, 17 INT'L LAw. 647, 649 (1983)(quoting Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law, 27
WASH. L. REv. 85, 103 (1952)).
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and also their ethnocentric outlook which prevents them from seeing
an ethical dilemma: "Frankly speaking, the moral consciousness is not
that keen. Probably people feel this is business. Most Japanese have
not seen what's going on there, so we are not psychologically or emotionally involved, as are the Americans or the British. "- Many business
leaders in Japan suggest that their actions need not be guided by
ethical considerations to the extent that ethics is something that is
individually determined. Hence, the group structure of society serves
as an inherent impediment to the determination of ethical behavior.
However, the fact that decisionmaking is determined by the group
as a whole and conducted as a group seems to validate the potential
for ethics since each member makes up the group. An analysis by
Thomas Dunfee on professional norms of business ethics may help
make the analogy more clear. Dunfee argues that ethics may be regarded by firms as a private matter to the extent that it guides "their
way" of doing business so that ethics are firm-dependent. 3 Moreover,
Dunfee continues that ethics in business practice are bound in the
culture of the business, thereby indicating that a business can make
ethical decisions. Dunfee continues his analysis by ascertaining that
this view of ethics is relativistic:
What is ethical is seen as varying with the environment of
the particular firm and its customs, history, and goals. Similar to the analysis of those who see ethics as essentially a
matter of personal conscience, it is left up to the individual
decisionmaker to define what is ethical. At its extreme, this
represents a principle of ethical anarchy. Ultimately, an individual firm or even a profession cannot determine definitively on a unilateral basis what is ethical for its members.
The decisions of the firm or profession must be subjected to
critical review by others."
VII.

CONCLUSION

The issue of apartheid ideally will bring Japan to the realization
that it is no longer an isolated country as it was in the Tokugawa
Period of Japanese history. It must realize that it is an international
actor that affects all of the 160 nation-states in the world. The necessity

42. Chira, supra note 35, at D1, col 6 (quoting Kazuo Nukazawa, Director of the International Economic Affairs Department of the Keidanren).
43. Dunfee, The Case for Professional Norms of Business Ethics, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 385,
391 (1987).
44. Id. at 392.
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of realizing this cannot be overemphasized as the growing interdependence of the international community will require amicable relations
among all actors. Integral to the realization -of this will be the recognition of ethical and moral actions of business and government and
the public pressure necessary to serve as a watchdog of their actions.
By asserting this, we do not wish to argue for or against sanctions
as that is a matter of discussion for an entirely different topic. However, the fact that Japan has proclaimed to oppose apartheid and has
adopted policy statements in this regard is of relevance in determining
the ethical implications of Japan's actions. Japan cannot continue to
say one thing and do another if it wishes to become a global power.
Essentially, for Japan to win the war, somewhere, somehow, the discr6pancy between tatamaeand honne must be alleviated. Fundamental
to an alleviation of this discrepancy is responsibility for its actions in
terms of government and business.
Therefore, the time has come for Japan to revise its theory of
human existence to make it compatible with the international persona.
Intrinsic in this revision is a definition of Japan's position in the international community. Specifically, whatever route Japan decides to take
in defining its fate, Japan clearly will not be able to identify itself
from a strictly nationalistic point of view. Thus, not only must Japan
elude itself of the supposed superiority of the Japanese people, it must
also begin to identify itself in terms of outside concerns so that Japan's
actions are not just considered in terms of how they affect Japan
alone. Essentially, Japan must assume moral responsibility for its
actions. This is not to say that Japan should continue to appease
outside criticism, for that would not be indicative of a global power.
Instead, Japan must learn to make a decision on its own without
pressure from outside sources. Most importantly, once a decision has
been made, Japan must learn to act in accordance with the prescripts
of the decision. Such an idea means that in devising a policy, Japan
must give up the tatamae and act only in terms of the honne. The
necessity of doing so is integral to the identity of Japan in the world
arena for "[t]here is even more at stake in the economic policy decisions
Japan now faces, though it is intangible and elusive: Japan's position
'' 45
in the world, if not its identity.
Japan's current actions have been those of a backward nation attempting to look modern; those of a nation guiding itself under false
pretenses of economic vulnerability; those of a nation acting in order
to serve its own interests for self enrichment. The realization of its

45.

Drucker, Japan's Choices, 65 FOREIGN AFF. 923, 939 (1987).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

19

INTERNATIONAL
Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. LAW
5, Iss.JOURNAL
1 [1989], Art. 3

[Vol. 5

attributes and its potential possibly can lead Japan in the direction of
true modernity and to a position of global power. However, this can
only be accomplished if Japan begins to see itself for what it is. This
necessitates erasing the image of itself as a poor country. The legitimacy of this statement is evidenced by the following statement which
proves that the poor country mentality is an idea whose time has
gone: "Perhaps our single-minded and arrogant view would be understandable if Japan were truly a tiny nation, fighting against terrible
odds just to survive. But it is not any longer. Tiny, weak Japan is a
myth. And the world has shared our belief in this myth until re-

cently. "46
The necessity of defining its position can be seen in the fact that
Japan's actions have significant impact upon the global order. Specifically, "Whatever the path of the U.S.-Japan relationship in the coming
decade, it will influence substantially - perhaps decisively - the
' '47
shape of global economic regimes in the early twenty-first century.
Unless Japan realizes the necessity for a change in its actions and its
position vis-d-vis the rest of the world, the possibility of becoming a
global power will disintegrate.

46. Ohmae, supra note 16, at 44.
47. Tarullo, Forward: The Structure of U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations, 27 HARV. INTL
L.J. 343, 360 (1986) (Special Issue 27 on U.S.-Japan trade relations).
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